Understanding a market maker's self-interested goals is critical to evaluating whether an engagement structure aligns with your project's objectives. Each model creates different economic incentives that shape how the market maker behaves — and where potential conflicts may arise.

In a retainer + working capital engagement, the market maker's primary goals are to sustain a recurring monthly revenue stream (the retainer fee) and managing the loaned capital to grow its net asset value (NAV) — particularly when profit-sharing arrangements exist — and demonstrating consistent performance to retain the contract long-term. Because the market maker does not own the tokens or the working capital, their economic interest is tied to fee income and, when applicable, a share of positive quote delta (the increase in stablecoin value of the portfolio). This creates a generally conservative incentive structure where the market maker benefits from stability and gradual capital appreciation rather than aggressive directional bets.

In a loan + call option engagement, the market maker's goals are more complex and potentially more adversarial. Their primary objective is to sell the loaned tokens above the call option strike price to capture the spread. Secondary goals include short selling and covering at lower prices during volatile periods, exercising call options when they are in-the-money at expiry, and generating profit through gamma scalping — a strategy that exploits price volatility around strike prices using perpetual futures markets. Because the market maker profits from token price movement (in either direction, if they can hedge effectively), their incentives can diverge significantly from the project's interest in price stability and orderly markets. This is the structural basis for why loan + call option engagements carry higher risk of adversarial behavior.